DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT-1974
INTRODUCTION

The Freedom of Information Act1 (FOIA) was passed by Congress in 1966 as a reaction to the Public Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act,2 which had become more of an agency
withholding statute than a disclosure statute.'
The purpose of the
FOIA is to make available to any person upon request substantially all
the information in the hands of government agencies. 4 Agency officials can refuse disclosure only when the information requested is specifically exempt under one or more of the nine statutory exemptions, 5
and the burden is on the agency to justify its withholding in a de novo
judicial review of the agency decision. 6 Vague statutory language7 and
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R.
REP. No. 1497];
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
813];
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICF, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE
PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACT (1967) [hereinafter cited
as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM];

Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-973, 1974
DUKE L.J. 251 [hereinafter cited as FOIA Comment].
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974). Several important amendments enacted on November 21, 1974, became effective on February 19, 1975. Most of the changes made thereby are procedural and thus will have little
effect on the substantive case law developed during 1974 and prior years. Those amendments that do make substantive changes are discussed in appropriate footnotes. References to the procedural changes are also made whenever they can be profitably included
in the discussion of a 1974 development. For a discussion of the action governmental
agencies must take in order to comply with the 1975 amendments, see Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum: Preliminary Guidance Concerning the 1974 Freedom of
Information Act Amendments, Dec. 11, 1974.
2. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946).
3. HousE COMM. ON GovERNmENT OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF TM F EEoM OF INFORMATION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972); H.R.
REP. No. 1497, at 6; S. REP. No. 813, at 5.
4. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 1; S. RE. No. 813, at 3.
5. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 2
(a), (b) (Nov. 21, 1974).
6. Id. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (1)(b)
(1) (Nov. 21, 1974); see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 977, on remand, 383 F. Supp. 1049 (D.D.C. 1974).
7. Many of the interpretation problems encountered under the FOIA were anticipated by Professor Davis. See Davis, The Information Act: A Pre-Analysis, 34 U.
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sometimes conflicting legislative history,8 combined with agency reluctance to release information, have thrust the burden of interpreting
the Act upon the courts.
The public's increasing awareness of the FOIA, combined with
steadfast recalcitrance on the part of federal agencies to release requested information, sustained the heavy volume of FOIA litigation in
1974. Four of the Act's nine exemptions received judicial scrutiny
during 1974 as the courts struggled to define the terms "specifically exempt" for purposes of the statutory exemption; "confidential" under
the financial and commercial information exemption, "unwarranted invasion" under the personnel and medical files exemption, and "law enforcement purposes" under the investigatory files exemption. Also of
significance were the Supreme Court's consideration of the equitable
powers available to an FOIA court and the possible emergence of a
right in third parties to assert the Act's exemptions to prevent agencies
from disclosing information. Probably the most far-reaching recent development was the enactment of amendments to the FOIA which will
insure 'greater cooperation and speed in the agencies' response to requests for information. This Note critically describes these developments in the context of the Act's judicial and legislative history and
attempts to assess their impact on the FOIA's underlying policy favoring the disclosure of information in the hands of federal agencies.
POWER OF THE COURTS UNDER

=HE FOIA

Although the majority of the 1974 FOIA litigation again dealt
with the delineation of one or more of the nine exemptions of the Act,
the issue of the availability of traditional equity powers to courts enforcing the Act also received attention and was the subject of the second
United States Supreme Court decision construing the FOIA.9 Litigation in this area has primarily involved two separate issues. A major
controversy involving the power of the courts under the FOIA has been
Car. L. REV. 761, 762, 802-12 (1967). See also Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play:
Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TExAs L. REv. 1261, 1262

(1970).
8. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 9, with S. R-P. No. 813, at 3.
9. Renegotiation Ed. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974). See notes
12-32 infra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court first considered the FOIA in
1973 in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), when it construed the national security exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a) (Nov.
21, 1974), and the inter-agency memoranda exemption, id. § 552(b) (5). The Court's
ruling as to the first exemption was overruled by amendments to the FOIA recently
passed by Congress. Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1) (1970).
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whether the courts possess the equitable discretion to refuse to order
disclosure of non-exempt information. 10 A second issue has been
whether the FOIA permits the judicial exercise of equitable jurisdiction
to enjoin an ongoing administrative proceeding pending disposition of
an FOIA claim for records relevant to that proceeding. 1 The Supreme Court in 1974 did not clearly resolve either issue, but it did suggest that in applying the Act courts have not been stripped by the FOIA
of their traditional equity powers.
EquitableJurisdictionto Enjoin OngoingAdministrative Proceedings
In Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 2 the Su-

preme Court reversed the granting of temporary injunctions enjoining
proceedings of the Renegotiation Board' 3 pending resolution of FOIA
claims by government contractors for the disclosure of information to
be used during these proceedings.

4

However, the Court explicitly re-

10. The existence of equitable discretion to deny disclosure of non-exempt material
has been affirmed by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, while the Fourth, Sixth, and District
of Columbia Circuits have rejected it. Compare Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); General Servs. Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969); Long v. IRS,
349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972); and Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436
F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971), with Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc.
v. Federal Housing Administration, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 107677 (D.C. Cir. 1971); and Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971).
11. Compare Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1474 (1974); Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974);
and Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970) (each indicating that a district court does have jurisdiction to stay an administrative action pending the outcome of an FOIA claim in court), with Sterling Drug
Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 710-12 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
NLRB, 433 F.2d 210, 211 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (both concluding that the district court lacks jurisdiction to stay administrative action).
12. 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
13. Under the Renegotiation Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211 et seq. (1970), the Renegotiation Board has broad powers to eliminate excessive profits made by defense contractors and subcontractors. Id. § 1191(c). There are several levels of renegotiation
with nonbinding recommendations from each level being forwarded to the next, but a
de novo determination of excess profits will be made at each level. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1472.3
(d)(f), (h)-(i), .4(b) (1974). From the final order of the Board, the contractor has
an appeal of right to the Court of Claims, which also makes a de novo determination
of excess profits. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1218 (Supp. II, 1972).
14. The Bannercraft decision involved three cases consolidated by the circuit court
-Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., Astro Communication Laboratory v.
Renegotiation Bd., and David B. Lilly Co. v. Renegotiation Bd.-in which the Renego-
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frained from announcing a general rule concerning the enjoining of
other administrative proceedings because of the sui generis nature of
the Renegotiation Act process.15
Before the Supreme Court, the Board argued that since the FOIA

(1) expressly authorizes a district court to compel disclosure of information improperly withheld, (2) places the burden on the agency to
sustain its withholding, and (3) directs that FOIA suits shall take precedence over others,1 6 Congress intended these provisions to "constitute the exclusive method for enforcing the disclosure requirements
. . . and that any implication of other injunctive power, . . . would

be inconsistent with the statutory language."'

7

The contractors, on the

other hand, argued that although the FOIA does not expressly grant
district courts the power to enjoin administrative proceedings, such

power is implied in the court's inherent capacity to provide appropriate
equitable relief. 18

Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,1 9 seem-

tiation Board had refused to disclose information requested by contractors during the renegotiation of their contracts. Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d
345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974). Basically, the
documents requested would reveal "the strength or weakness of the Board's case against
the contractors and the facts or assumptions on which the Board relie[d] in assessing
liability." 415 U.S. at 29 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Upon refusal by the Board to disclose the information, each contractor filed an FOIA suit in which the district courts
enjoined further renegotiation pending a decision on the merits of the FOIA claim. The
court of appeals affirmed, holding both that the district courts possessed jurisdiction
under the FOIA to enjoin currently ongoing administrative proceedings before the Board
as well as to order production of the appropriate documents and that in renegotiation
proceedings the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not bar such relief.
466 F.2d at 354-55.
The circuit court reasoned that since exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the FOIA was
granted to federal district courts, there could be no proper grounds for asserting that
the availability of a legal remedy or the need to respect administrative jurisdiction required such exhaustion. Id. at 360. The Supreme Court did not expressly disagree with
the circuit court's general discussion of the exhaustion doctrine, but did determine that
exhaustion was inapplicable under the Renegotiation Act. 415 U.S. at 20. See note
23 infra.
Bannercraft was cited in another 1974 FOIA case for the proposition "that as a
general matter persons requesting information should exhaust administrative remedies
prior to seeking judicial review." Diapulse Corp. of America v. FDA, 500 F.2d 75, 77
(2d Cir. 1974). But see Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1(c) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). For a discussion of section 1(c), see note 23 infra.
15. 415 U.S. at 20. See note 23 infra.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §
(1)(a) (Nov.21, 1974).
17. 415 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original).
18. Id.
19. Joining Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion were Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Brennan, White, and Rehnquist. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined,
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ingly agreed with the argument advanced by the contractors since he
concluded that "[w]ith the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in
the district court by § 552(a), there is little to suggest, despite the Act's

primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of
an equity court. 2 °
Despite its recognition of a district court's equitable jurisdiction
under the FOIA, the Supreme Court reversed the granting of the in-

junctions, holding that the special nature of the renegotiation process2
20. 415 U.S. at 20 (dictum). In an earlier passage of the opinion, the Court referred to the "Act's primary purpose" as being "'to enable the public to have sufficient
information in order to be able, through the electoral process, to make intelligent, informed choices with respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of federal governmental
activities.'" Id. at 17, quoting Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
The Court's conclusion that the FOIA did not limit the inherent powers of an
equity court immediately followed the Court's justification:
The broad language of the FOIA, with its obvious emphasis on disclosure
and with its exemptions carefully delineated as exceptions; the truism that Congress knows how to deprive a court of broad equitable power when it chooses
so to do.. .; and the fact that the Act, to a definite degree, makes the district courts the enforcement arm of the statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3), persuade
us that . . . [the] principle of a statutorily prescribed special and exclusive
remedy is not applicable to FOIA cases. Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
The Bannercraft dictum that the FOIA does not in most circumstances limit the
equitable powers of a court lends support to the unusual remedy decreed by the court
in Levine v. United States, 34 A. L.2D 633 (S.D. Fla., Mar. 2, 1974), where documents
ultimately found by the court to be non-exempt were destroyed by the government while
the FOIA suit was in progress. The court rejected the District Director's argument that
destruction of the documents had mooted the FOIA disclosure issue and, after finding
the material non-exempt under the FOIA, ordered that the declaration forms be reconstructed as far as possible from the case reports filed by the agents themselves which
would otherwise be exempt as investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes.
Id. at 642. To do otherwise would "set a precedent for allowing the destruction of documents sought under the Act without taking the steps necessary to correct the ultimate
effect of such destruction [which] would have a devastating effect on the viability of
the Act." Id.
In Washington Research Project Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the
circuit court interpreted Bannercraft as supporting broad equitable powers under the
FOIA but ruled that the district court had inappropriately exercised these powers in ordering HEW to amend its regulations to comply with the court's decision that research
protocols and proposed grant applications be made available to the public. Id. at 252-53.
There was no warrant in the record for anticipating that HEW "would not proceed in
good faith to incorporate the substance of a final court decision into its rules and practices." Id. at 253.
21. Before adoption of the FOIA, the Court had consistently held that the design
of the Renegotiation Act required expeditious proceedings free from interruption for judicial review by injunction prior to the exhaustion of the administrative process. 415
U.S. at 20; see Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 789-93 (1948) (statutory and
procedural grounds); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947)
(constitutional grounds); Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946) (statutory grounds). The Court characterized renegotiation as a "bargaining process" in
which each party attempts to assert his own strength and exploit the weaknesses of his
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precluded a court from the exercise of this traditional equity power.2"
By restricting its prohibition on stays of the administrative process under the FOIA to renegotiation cases and by indicating by way of dictum
that the FOIA did not restrict the range of powers available to an eq-

uity court, Bannercraft suggests that, in a proper case, an FOIA court
may enjoin other ongoing administrative proceedings.23
opponent's position. 415 U.S. at 21-22. The uncertainty inherent in any type of bargaining (the Court compared it to playing a hand of poker, 415 U.S. at 25) was intentionally made a part of the renegotiation process by Congress. The calculated risk taken
by a contractor who does not settle early in the negotiations is that he may eventually
have to pay more. The Court, however, did not think the risk was overbearing, "for
it is counterbalanced by the profound interest of the public in the recapture of excessive
profits that may flow to the contractor under its government contracts." Id. The Court
could find nothing in the adoption of the FOIA indicating "that Congress wished to
change the Renegotiation Act's purposeful design of negotiation without interruption for
judicial review." Id. at 22.
22. We find it unnecessary, however, to decide in these cases, whether, or under
what circumstances, it would be proper for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction to enjoin agency action pending the resolution of an asserted FOIA
claim. We hold only that in a renegotiation case the contractor is obliged to
pursue its administrative remedy and, when it fails to do so, may not attain
its ends through the route of judicial interference. The nature of the renegotiation process mandates this result, and, were it otherwise, the effect would
be that renegotiation, and its aims, would be supplanted and defeated by an
FOIA suit. 415 U.S. at 20.
23. The circumstances in which a district court could enjoin an ongoing administrative proceeding would presumably be those outlined in the circuit court's opinion: (1)
where there is a threat of irreparable injury to substantive rights; (2) where no adequate
remedy at law is available through statutory modes of relief; and (3) where the intervention would not be in derogation of the agency's jurisdiction. Bannercraft Clothing
Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 355-60 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
These requirements set down by the circuit court for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction to enjoin ongoing administrative proceedings were relied upon by a district court
in 1974 to deny plaintiff's request that FTC proceedings against it be enjoined pending
release of certain records requested from the agency under the FOIA. In Control Data
Corp. v. FTC, No. 4-74-Civil 25 (D. Minn., Mar. 4, 1974), the court held that even
reading the Supreme Court's Bannercraft opinion so as to permit federal courts to enjoin
ongoing administrative proceedings other than renegotiations, Control Data had not alleged facts showing a sufficient threat of "irreparable injury" to bring it within the guidelines established by the circuit court's Bannercraft opinion for the exercise of that equitable power. Id. at 7. The burdens alleged by Control Data included: inability to locate key witnesses to rebut the FTC charges; fading memories of those witnesses they
did locate; costs of their defense in the agency proceedings; and unfavorable publicity
generated by the FTC charges. Id. The court found these burdens to be no more than
those normally incident to any vindication of a right through legal channels, not "extraordinary circumstances" justifying a stay of the administrative proceedings. Id. at 8.
See also Lenon v. Richardson, 378 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (agency proceeding
not enjoined since no irreparable injury likely).
The Control Data court did, however, retain jurisdiction over the FOIA claim and
ordered the FTC to submit the requested documents to the court within ten days for
an in camera examination so it could determine whether the information was exempt.
No. 4-74-Civil 25, at 9. Since further action in the administrative proceedings was not
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That dictum in Bannercraft has been adopted by two subsequent
1974 cases to overcome the government's argument that a district court
has limited jurisdiction in an FOIA case and may only grant injunctive
relief.

In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Saxbe2 4 the dis-

trict court ruled that the FOIA did not limit it to granting injunctive
relief25 and that it had jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief that Consumers Union was entitled as a matter of right to disclosure of certain
documents 26 in the possession of the Antitrust Division of the Justice

Department even though the Attorney General had, as a matter of discretion, released the documents after commencement of the FOIA
scheduled until later in the year, Control Data, assuming the court found the records
not exempt from disclosure, essentially gained its objective of acquiring the records for
its defense of the FTC charges. Control Data's FOIA request had been rejected by the
FTC and there was no provision for an agency review of that decision, thus freeing Control Data to seek relief in the district court. Once an FOIA suit is filed in a district
court, it is given precedence over all but the most important matters, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)
(3) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (1)(b)(1) (Nov. 21, 1974),
and relief is usually rapid, as Control Data illustrates. In many instances, however, an
elaborate or slow-working appeal process within an agency and the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before resort to the courts is permitted combine to
prevent a party from qualifying for the expedited procedure of the federal courts. In
part to solve this problem, Congress included in the 1975 FOIA amendments a ten-day
limit within which an agency must respond to a request for records and a twenty-day
limit for a response to an appeal from the agency's initial decision. A person shall be
deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies on his FOIA request if these time
limits are not met. Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 1(c) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (1970). Permitting a party earlier access to the federal courts for a determination of his FOIA claim will both reduce the pressure on courts to enjoin ongoing administrative proceedings and reduce the incentive for agency recalcitrance in responding
to an FOIA claim. See note 11 supra and cases cited therein.
Unlike the circuit court, the Supreme Court in Bannercraft considered the entire
multi-tier structure of the renegotiation process, see note 13 supra, as constituting the
administrative remedy requiring exhaustion before judicial intervention would be sanctioned. It stated that the de novo proceeding in the Court of Claims, where the usual
rights of discovery are available, "is the judicial remedy at law provided by the Renegotiation Act and is adequate protection against injury." 415 U.S. at 23. But see id. at
30-33 (Douglas, J.,dissenting). Presumably resort to the FOIA would be permissible
in a collateral proceeding during the renegotiation stages and would also be available
in conjunction with discovery at the Court of Claims level. Bannercraft Clothing Co.
v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 355-60 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
415 U.S. 1 (1974).
24. 34 AD.L.2D 992 (D.D.C. May 9, 1974). The court read Bannercraftas "granting the district court latitude to enter relief appropriate to carry out the Congressional
intent of the Act." Id.at 994.
25. Id. at 995.
26. Consumers Union is a nonprofit membership corporation which publishes Consumer Reports Magazine. It sought disclosure of documents pertaining to a proposed
merger of two companies to discover if such a merger would have an anti-competitive
effect resulting in increases in the cost of goods and services to consumers. Id. at 993.
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suit.2 7 The court found the requisite case or controversy in the declaratory action since Consumers Union would undoubtedly continue to seek
public disclosure of similar documents, and, if the Justice Department

continued "its policy of trickling out documents" at its own discretion,
Consumers Union would otherwise have "no way to gain meaningful

review of the scope of [the Department's] discretion.

28

In another

application of the FOIA, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in summarily remanding Packer v. Kleindienst 29 for further pro-

ceedings not inconsistent with Bannercraft, must have applied similar
reasoning. Packer involved a request for audits of states seeking
grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which at
the time had a policy of releasing such information no sooner than 150
days after submission to it by the receiving states. While the FOIA
suit was in progress, plaintiff was given all the material she sought, and

the government's subsequent motion for summary judgment was granted.30 Although the district court found that the case was not mootthere existed a case or controversy on the issue of prompt disclosure 8 '

-it

ruled its jurisdiction was limited to granting injunctive relief to

compel disclosure which, since the documents were already released,

it could no longer grant. However, the remand order by the circuit
27. Id. at 995. The Attorney General argued that the court had only limited jurisdiction under section 552(a)(3) of the FOIA and was restricted to granting injunctive
relief. Id. at 994. See also Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. ICC, 35 AD.
L.2D 578 (D.D.C., Aug. 13, 1974), where, although recognizing its power to do so, the
court refused to grant a declaratory judgment that certain records were not exempt under
the FOIA after the agency had released them during the FOIA action. The court could
find no reason to suspect that the agency would refuse to release similar records upon
request in the future, nor did the agency have a history of refusing FOIA requests and
then "mooting-out" the issue by releasing the information before a court could rule on
its exempt status. Id. at 581. Under these circumstances, the court concluded no useful
purpose could be served by granting the declaratory relief and declined to exercise its
discretion. Id.
28. 34 AD. L.2D at 995. The court applied the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" exception to the mootness doctrine. See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). Consumers Union was faced with the problem of prompt
disclosure to make effective use of the information to alert the consuming public to the
possible anti-competitive effects of proposed mergers so they could exert political or economic pressure to defeat the merger. Warning the public of possible anti-competitive
effects of a completed merger would not permit the public to influence the merger decision itself.
29. No. 73-2055 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 5, 1974) (remand order). The case is not otherwise reported, but it is cited and discussed in Consumers Union of United States, Inc.
v. Saxbe, 34 AD. L.2D 992, 995 (D.D.C., May 9, 1974).
30. For a discussion of these facts, see Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Saxbe, 34 AD.L.2D 992, 995 (D.D.C., May 9, 1974).
31. Id.
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court suggests that an FOIA court's jurisdiction is not so limited. 2
Equitable Discretion to Refuse to Order Disclosure of Non-exempt
Information

However broadly one wishes to read the Bannercraft suggestion
that a court is not restricted in the use of its traditional equity powers

so as to support the acquisition of jurisdiction to hear an FOIA suit,
the dictum should not be stretched to imply that once jurisdiction is
established a court has equitable discretion to refuse to compel disclo-

sure of non-exempt information. Bannercraft itself was only concerned with whether a court could enjoin an administrative proceeding
pending a determination of the merits of an FOIA suit-the merits
were not before the Court,33 and it drew no inference concerning the

power of a court with respect to discretionary nondisclosure. 4
Those courts that indicate equitable discretion to refuse to compel
disclosure of non-exempt information does exist35 rely primarily upon
that part of the FOIA which provides: "On complaint, the district court
* . .

has jurisdictionto enjoin the agency from withholding agency rec-

ords and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant."3 6 Further support for this position
32. Id.
33. 415 U.S. at 26.
34. However, the Court did recognize that the "broad language of the FOIA" had
an "obvious emphasis on disclosure" with "its exemptions carefully delineated as exceptions," id. at 19, and that the disclosure provision in section 552(a) "covers virtually
all information not specifically exempted by § 552(b)," id. at 12. See also Sears v.
Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 128 & n.13 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3297 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974) (No. 74-584) (reiterating the Fourth Circuit's view that an
agency could resist disclosure only on the basis of one or more of the exemptions).
35. See, e.g., Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); General Servs. Administration v. Benson,
415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972);
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). But cf. Epstein
v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (limited role
of courts under the first and third exemptions). See also Montrose Chem. Corp. v.
Train, 491 F.2d 63, 66 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (district court arguably may exercise such
equitable discretion).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-503 § (1)
(b) (1) (Nov. 21, 1974) (emphasis added). Professor Davis is the harbinger to those
courts which interpret this language as authorizing the use of equitable discretion to limit
the reach of the Act's mandatory disclosure provisions. K. DAVIs § 3A.6 (Supp. 1970).
Professor Davis thinks the word "enjoin" is enough to invoke the traditions of equity
since "an equity court by its intrinsic nature has a discretionary power to refuse to participate in bringing about results that are inconsistent with sound equitable practice."
Id. at 123. He suggests that any court that has jurisdiction to enforce the FOIA also
has jurisdiction to refuse to enforce it whenever equity traditions so require. Id. at 124.
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is found in the House Report accompanying the FOIA. r On the other
hand, courts refusing to find such equitable discretion 8 also rely upon
the express language of the statute 9 as well as its legislative history.4"
They conclude that in enacting the FOIA Congress itself has already
weighed the merits of disclosure and has found secrecy appropriate

only in the nine specifically exempt categories. According to this
view, a court's equity powers should not be used to create new exemptions for otherwise non-exempt material. 1
The failure of the Supreme Court in Bannercraft to address the

issue of equitable discretion to withhold non-exempt information appears to have created additional uncertainty among the lower courts.
Although the issue was not directly presented for decision in 1974,

there are indications of a greater hesitancy to support one position over
the other.4 2 Both the Third Circuit, in Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. In37. "The Court will have authority whenever it considers such action equitable and
appropriateto enjoin the agency from withholding its records and to order production
of agency records improperly withheld." H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 9 (emphasis added).
But see S. RP. No. 813, at 3, quoted at note 40 infra.
38. See, e.g., Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS,
467 F.2d 787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing
Administration, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62 (6th Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
677-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971).
39. Such courts generally rely upon that part of the FOIA which provides: "This
section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records
to the public, except as specifically stated in this section." 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970)
(emphasis added). Congress probably intended the words "except as specifically stated"
to prevent courts from creating new exemptions rather than to restrict the breadth of
the exemptions listed in section 552(b). See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)
(exemptions are made "exclusive" by subsection (c)); accord, Wellman Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 61 (1974).
40. Senate Report 813 provides in part:
It is the purpose of the present bill to eliminate such phrases [as "requiring secrecy," "in the public interest," or "required for good cause to be held
confidential," and] to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure
unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language
It is essential that agency personnel, and the courts as well, be given
definitive guidelines in setting information policies. Standards such as "for
good cause" are certainly not sufficient. SuN. RE,.No. 813, at 3.
One commentator concluded that the conflict in the language of the Act and in the legislative history, compare note 37 and text accompanying note 36 with notes 39 and 40,
must be resolved in favor of preserving the equitable discretion of the district courts.
Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L.
REv. 897, 914 (1974). This approach, however, fails to adequately consider the consequences that may result from the general recognition of judicial equitable discretion.
See notes 51-54 infra and accompanying text.
41. For a general discussion of non-FOIA cases interpreting injunctive provisions
similar to section 552(a)(3) in the context of equitable discretion and arriving at conflicting conclusions, see Note, supra note 40, at 915-18.
42. The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its opposition to equitable discretion in Wellman
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ternal Revenue Service,43 and the Second Circuit, in Rose v. Department of the Air Force,"' abstained from expressly declaring themselves
on the point, although Rose appears to have cited Bannercraft properly

in stating that "[the Court is] clear that generally the Act constrains
the use of broad judicial discretion to block disclosure."45 Rose also
suggests, however, that the true controversy may be over the definition
of an exceptional case, "since even the courts that are cited as opposing
the notion of general equity power to refuse disclosure recognize that

a truly exceptional case might require it."48 The District of Columbia
Circuit lends support to that suggestion in its opinion in Tax Analysts
& Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service,47 where it held that Internal

Revenue Service (IRS) letter rulings were not specifically exempt from
disclosure by statutes protecting income tax returns. 48 Then, in response to the IRS request to deny disclosure on equitable grounds, the
court stated that there was nothing in the factors present in the case

which were absent in the other FOIA cases49 to compel it to change
its previous holdings "that a District Court has no jurisdiction under
the Act to deny disclosure, apart from the exemptions contained in the
Act, on equitable grounds."'5 The implication remains that where the
proper factors heretofore not present in the cases are found to exist,

equitable discretion to deny disclosure might be invoked.
Absent definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, and espe-

cially in view of the conflicting legislative history of the FOIA,5 ' courts
considering the issue of equitable discretion to refuse to compel disclosure of non-exempt information should place considerable emphasis on
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 61 (1974),
but the case was decided before the Bannercraft decision was handed down.
43. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
Because we believe that the information requested by Wine Hobby is exempt
from disclosure under a specific statutory exemption, we need not reach the
question of whether, were the material not specifically exempted, the district
court possesses equitable jurisdiction to decline to order disclosure. Id. at 13738.
44. 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974). The court thought the issue of equitable discrelion in the context of the personal privacy exemption was not substantial "since the language of the exemption requires a court to exercise a large measure of discretion." Id.
at 269. See notes 126-148 infra and accompanying text.
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Id., citing Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 464
F.2d 657, 662 (6th Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
47. 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
48. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103(a)(1), 7213(a)(1) (1970). These provisions are discussed
in the statutory exemption section of this Note, text accompanying notes 99-102 infra.
49. The District of Columbia Circuit cases cited were Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d
670 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
50. 505 F.2d at 355.
51. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 9, with S. REP. No. 813, at 3.
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the policy of the Act. The FOIA was enacted to correct the deficiencies of its predecessor statute52 whose vague wording was interpreted
to permit agencies discretion in the initial determination of what information to disclose. 3 Permitting courts to exercise discretion in the
disclosure process would defeat the attempt by Congress to provide
clear standards for making information available to the public. Even
though the discretion would no longer be in the agencies but rather
in the courts, the agencies would be encouraged to refuse disclosure
and argue the equitable merits of their position before the courts. The.
result would be frequent litigation over those concepts which the FOIA
was enacted to eliminate from the disclosure decision: whether disclosure is "in the public interest", whether the requesting party is "properly and directly concerned", and whether "good cause" exists for denying disclosure.5 4 Rejecting equitable discretion in the courts to deny
disclosure of non-exempt information, on the other hand, would foster
the attempt by Congress to bring clarity to the disclosure process.
Rather than resulting in perennial uncertainty as to the result in any
particular case and thus fostering even more unnecessary litigation, the
courts' recognition of the exclusivity of the statutory exemptions will,
after a period of definition, provide clear guidelines for the agencies'
use in all cases.
THe EXEMPTIONS: COMPULSORY OR PERMISSIVE?

Must an agency refuse to disclose information that is within one
or more of the exemptions of the FOIA? May a party which an exemption is designed to protect properly invoke that exemption when
disclosure is threatened? Most FOIA litigation has involved a determination of whether information being sought by a private person and
withheld by a government agency was legitimately exempted from
compulsory disclosure by one of the Act's nine exemptions.5" The issue of whether an agency could release exempt information has been
raised infrequently because agencies have tended to withhold information unless compelled by a court to release it.5 6 In 1974, how52. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238.

53. S. REP. No. 813, at 5.
54. This was the language contained in the Public Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act, Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238. One purpose of the FOIA was to eliminate these concepts from the disclosure decision. H.R.
REP. No. 1497, at 5; S. REP. No. 813, at 5.
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 2(a),
(b) (Nov. 21, 1974).
56. See HousE Comm. ON GovERMmENT OPER.AnONs, supra note 3, at 2; H.R. REP.
No. 1497, at 6; S. REP, No. 813, at 3.
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ever, the issue of whether the exemptions may be used to prevent dis-

closure was considered by several courts.
Two courts in the same district, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Schlesinger5 7 and United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger,5 upheld the

right of a person who has submitted exempt information to the government to use the FOIA to prevent an agency from disclosing that information to a third party. In both cases, the government notified the
complaining corporations that it had decided to release to a requesting
party the corporations' latest Employer Information Reports and Affirmative Action Program filed with the Defense Supply Agency of the

Office of Federal Contract Compliance.59 Both Westinghouse and
United States Steel sued under the FOIA to prevent disclosure of the
information, claiming it to be protected by the commercial or financial
information exemption. 60 In enjoining the government from disclosing
The issue was raised in Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212
(D.D.C. 1973), but did not become the central issue. There the court granted a permanent injunction enjoining HUD from disclosing information "confidential by its very
nature," id. at 213, but not otherwise identified by the court, to a third party upon complaint by Charles River Park "A", Inc., which had submitted the information to the
agency. The government made the argument that agencies were "free to disclose or to
withhold records which are within the scope of the exemptions, unless otherwise restricted by different statutes," id., while Charles River Park "A", Inc. argued that the
exemptions were intended to prohibit disclosure. In a thoroughly unsatisfactory decision, the court rejected both of these arguments, saying that the FOIA simply did not
apply, id., and it granted the injunction on the basis of section 1905 of Title eighteen,
United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970), which prohibits the disclosure of confidential information not otherwise permitted by law. The finding of confidentiality was
based upon an "implied understanding" between the corporation and H'UD. 360 F.
Supp. at 213. Without more, an implied promise of confidentiality has been rejected
as creating a duty to withhold information under the FOIA in a majority of cases addressing the issue. See cases cited in FOIA Comment 265 n.84. The court also indicated that it could order the information withheld under its equity powers to prevent
an abuse of agency discretion. 360 F. Supp. at 213. This view has also been rejected
by the better authority under the FOIA. See notes 33-54 supra and accompanying text.
The court's attempt to take the case out from under the FOIA is unsatisfactory. The
issue in the case should have been whether section 1905 specifically exempted the information from disclosure under the statutory exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1970)a position uniformly rejected by other courts, see note 76 infra-and, if so, whether a
private party can invoke the exemption.
57. 34 A. L.2D 1074 (E.D. Va., Apr. 4, 1974).
58. 35 AD. L.2D 790 (E.D. Va., Sept. 20, 1974).
59. All government contractors are required to file the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7 (1974), and the Affirmative Action Program
(AAP), id. § 60-1.40. The purpose of these reports is the "promotion and insuring of
equal opportunities for all persons, without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, employed or seeking employment with Government contractors
Id. § 60-1.1.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970). See notes 110-125 infra and accompanying text.
In Westinghouse, the corporation also asserted that the-reports were exempt from dis-
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that material which the courts found to be within the exemption, 6 ' both
courts rejected the government's arguments that the FOIA exemptions

were neither mandatory nor available to private parties in opposing dis-

closure.6 The court in Westinghouse found support for its position
in the congressional reports,6 and United States Steel relied entirely
upon the authority of the Westinghouse decision.
Despite the abruptness with which Westinghouse and United
closure under the investigatory files exemption, id. § 552(b) (7), as amended, Pub. L.
No. 93-502, § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974), and the statutory exemption, id. § 552(b) (3), in
conjunction with section 709(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-8(e) (1970). The investigatory files claim was rejected outright. 34 AD. L.2D
at 107. As for the statutory exemption, the court pointed out that section 709(e) created the EEOC and by its terms applied only to that agency, whereas the Office of Federal Contract Compliance was created under regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Labor pursuant to Executive Order 11246, and it was not clear whether that order
had a basis independent of section 709(e). Rather than decide this issue, the court
chose to rest its decision entirely upon the confidential information exemption. Id. at
1077.
That issue was decided in another 1974 case featuring a private party invoking the
FOIA against agency disclosure. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Servs. Administration, No. 74-1946 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 9, 1974), affg in part and rev'g in part, 384 F.
Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974), the court held that EEO-I's and AAP's were obtained by the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance pursuant to Executive Order 11246 and not pursuant to section 709(e), indicating that Executive Order 11246 was independent of Title
VII. The government, although willing to disclose the documents, had offered Sears an
opportunity to review them and point out which portions were exempt from mandatory
disclosure under the FOIA. Id. at 4. Sears claimed they were wholly exempt under
the statutory, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1970), and investigatory files exemptions, id. § 552
(b) (7), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974), and sought an injunction restraining the government from disclosing any of the information. At the
hearing Sears also argued that the commercial or financial information exemption, id.
§ 552(b) (4), or the personal privacy exemption, id. § 552(b) (6), applied. The district
court found neither the statutory nor the investigatory files exemption applicable but
stayed disposition on the other claimed exemptions to allow Sears an opportunity to specify for the government which sections of the documents were protected by them. 384
F. Supp. at 1000. The circuit court dissolved the stay and ordered the release of all
the information sought which Sears had not specified as exempt under exemptions four
and six. No. 74-1946, at 5. Although the court did not expressly so sfate, it is apparent
from the disposition of the case that it, too, was of the opinion that a person submitting
information to the government can invoke the FOIA exemptions to enforce nondisclosure of exempt material.
61. The courts concluded that release of the information in the reports would enable
a competitor to deduce labor costs, profit margin, and vulnerability to price change and
to obtain a forewarning on new products and process changes. 34 AD. L.2n at 1078;
35 AD. L.2D at 791. One of the purposes of the commercial or financial information
exemption is to protect an individual's competitive position.
62. 34 AD. L.2D at 1079; 35 AD. L.2D at 791. The actual holding of the court in
United States Steel was that the exemption "bars disclosure of the confidential commercial or financial information contained in the plaintiffs' AAPs and EEO-ls. . . without
the consent of the plaintiffs first had and obtained." Id. at 792 (emphasis added).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10; S. REP. No. 813, at 9.
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States Steel treat the issue, there is authority supporting the position
that the exemptions are solely permissive and only identify qualifying
information which an agency may withhold from compelled disclosure.
Professor Davis has maintained since the inception of the FOIA that it
contains no provision forbidding disclosure,64 and dictum in the 1974
case of Moore-McCormack Line, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp."' indicates that at
least one circuit court believes that "government officials may make
public that which [the FOIA] exempts."6' 6 Moreover, a congressional
committee undertaking a review of agency administration of the FOIA
clearly summed up what it considers to have been the intent of Congress in passing the Act by saying that "[t]he exceptions.

.

. [are] only

permissive, not mandatory. ' 67 A literal reading of the statute supports
these statements, "" as does the principle of full disclosure of informa64. K. DAVIS § 3A.5, at 122 (Supp. 1970); Davis, supra note 7, at 766.
65. No. 73-2165 (4th Cir., Dec. 27, 1974).
66. Id. at 11. In Moore-McCormack, the Department of Labor attempted to withhold under the intra-agency memorandum and investigatory files exemptions a portion
of an accident report it claimed contained the investigating officer's conclusion about
the cause of the accident. The court made its gratuitous statements concerning the permissive nature of the exemptions after finding that these exemptions were unavailable
to protect the paragraph in question. Id. See also Reliability of Elec. & Gas Serv., 4
P.U.R. 4th 141, 148 (F.P.C.), petition for rehearing denied, 4 P.U.R. 4th 163 (F.P.C.
1974) (exemptions are a privilege of the agency, not of one seeking to protect
the confidentiality of the information); cf. Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 384 F. Supp.
755, 762 & n.16 (D.D.C. 1974) (indicating that release of selected portions of
documents or release to selected persons does not waive the right of an agency to
claim an exemption from release of other portions or to other persons); Consumers
Union of United States, Inc. v. Saxbe, 34 At>. L.2D 992, 994 (D.D.C. May 9, 1974)
(government disclosing "as a matter of discretion" some of the sought documents).
67. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, supra note 3, at 7. There is no
provision in the recent amendments to the FOIA for agency consultation with persons
submitting information before such information may be released. Indeed, the requirement that agencies make their initial determination on disclosure within ten days after
receipt of a third party's request for the release of information, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §
(1) (c) (6) (A) (i) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970), indicates that
Congress was concerned only with whether an agency would assert an exemption and
not with whether an agency would voluntarily release otherwise protected information.
68. Without the gloss of legislative history or judicial interpretation, the FOIA states
simply that certain types of records shall be made available to the public by publication,
5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1) (1970), that others shall be made available for public inspection
and copying, id. § 552(a)(2), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (1) (a) (Nov. 21
1974), that any other reasonably described records be made available upon request, Pub.
L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), and that none of
the above applies to matters that are within the nine exemptions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)
(1)-(9) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 2(a), (b) (Nov. 21, 1974). That
is, matters within the exemptions do not have to be published, do not have to be made
available for inspection and copying, and do not have to be made available upon request.
The statute does not say matters within the exemptions must not be published, copied,
or disclosed.
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tion in the hands of the government, a goal that provided the impetus
for its enactment.
One cannot, however, review the hearings and committee reports
accompanying the FOIA without recognizing that Congress was also

deeply concerned with protecting an individual's right of privacy and
thus designed some of the exemptions to accommodate what it perceived to be legitimate private as well as governmental interests. 9
Tests devised by courts interpreting the exemptions dealing with privately submitted material to determine whether certain information can
be withheld under those exemptions have incorporated this desire to
protect legitimate private interests,70 probably with the expectation that
an agency will respect such interests and assert the exemption for their

protection. The fact remains, however, that Congress has not provided
clear guidance for the agencies or the courts in the administration of
the FOIA when an agency releases, or is willing to release, information

that would otherwise be exempt. Pending a clarification of congressional intent, it would seem, absent an objection from a party submitting the information, that the language of the FOIA does not compel
an agency to withhold any information. However, when a party who
has submitted information does object to its disclosure, the court should
look to the specific exemption invoked to determine whether that exemption has as one of its purposes the protection of a private party's
interest. 71 Where the exemption was intended to protect the asserted
69. See, e.g., ATroNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM iv; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10,
11; S. RnrP. No. 813, at 3, 7, 9. See also Hearings on S. 1666 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedureof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1964).
70. The non-governmental interests sought to be protected by the commercial or financial information exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970), are discussed in notes
118-20 infra and accompanying text; those inherent in the personal privacy exemption,
id. § 552(b)(6), appear in notes 142-48 infra and accompanying text. The only other
exemption directly related to protecting non-governmental interests is the exemption for
information concerning financial institutions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (8) (1970).
71. See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
73, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Rural Housing, the government offered to release, upon
authorization of any individual, information concerning that individual contained in its
report on racial and national origin discrimination by the Farmers Home Administration. Id. Although the requesting party did not obtain any releases, the court discussed
the relationship between the exemptions and the releases. The court stated that
presumably the Government has power to waive an exemption. However, in
so doing, the Government and a court, when its authority is invoked, must be
alert to protect other interests in confidentiality besides those of the Government which are present in each of the nine exemptions, some more obviously
than others. Id. (emphasis added).
The suggestion by the government that individual releases be obtained, according to the
court, would protect the privacy interest inherent in the personal privacy exemption, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970), from being indiscriminately disclosed if the terms of the
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private interest, an agency should respect the desire of the person submitting the information, and a court, consistent with the overall policy
of the FOIA, may order the agency to withhold that information. 72
STATUTORY EXEMPTION

Courts interpreting the exemption for matters that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by [another federal] statute7 7 have
examined with care whether such statutes identify with particularity the

matter sought to be withheld from compelled disclosure. In making
this examination, these courts have been faced with the difficult task
of reconciling the principle of full disclosure underlying the FOIA with

the legislative history of the statutory exemption which indicates that
the exemption would have no effect upon the validity of other statutes
that curtail the availability of information to the public. 74 These con-

flicting forces have not prevented the courts from uniformly holding
that a broad nondisclosure statute such as section 1905 of the Criminal
Code, which prohibits disclosure of any trade secrets or commercial or
financial information,75 does not satisfy the "specifically exempted...
by statute" criterion70 but have resulted in inconsistent holdings where
release were unambiguous. This compromise has the favorable effect of fostering the
fullest responsible disclosure while protecting the legitimate privacy interests of a person
supplying information to his government in confidence. Strict adherence to this approach would require that the party submitting information which qualifies for an exemption be notified of its pending release by the agency in all cases so that it can make
its objections known. As has been previously noted, however, see note 67 supra, there
is no provision in the FOIA for consultation between agency and submitter when a request for information has been made.
72. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502,
§ (1)(b) (1) (Nov. 21, 1974). Disclosure could still be justified if the private interest
would be protected adequately by deleting all identifying details. The weakness in the
Westinghouse and United States Steel opinions is their implication that exemptions compel the withholding of all information which would qualify as exempt, regardless of a
request by a private party for nondisclosure.
73. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
74. See, e.g., Hearingson S.1666, supranote 69, at 6 (statement of Senator Edward
V. Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee). The House Report states that there are
"nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes which restrict" disclosure of information that
are not affected by the FOIA. H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10. It also refers to a House
Committee Print which lists examples of such nondisclosure statutes--STAFF OF HousE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATION, 89TH CONG., 21 SEss., FEDERAL STATUTES ON Tim

AVAIAmLrTY OF INFORMATON (Comm. Print 1960).

75. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
76. See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578,
580 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469-70
(D.D.C. 1972); Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675, 678-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); cf. California
v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733, 735 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afrd sub nom. California v.
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a statute
vests a degree of discretion in an agency in the disclosure deci7

sion. 7

One such discretionary nondisclosure statute that enjoyed mixed
success in the courts in 1974 under the statutory exemption is section

1306 of the Social Security Act,78 which prohibits "disclosure of ...
any file, record, report or other paper, or any information, obtained
. . . by the Secretary . . . in the course of discharging [his] . . . duties under [the Social Security Act] . . . except as the Secretary . . .
may by regulations prescribe." 79 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1974) (where the court concluded that since section
1905 permits disclosure when "authorized by law," and since disclosures made pursuant
to the FOIA are provided for by law, the two statutes are not in conflict).
Several 1974 cases also considered section 1905. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 34 A. L.2D 1074 (E.D. Va., Apr. 4, 1974), the court presented plaintiff's
argument that section 1905 and section 709(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2 000e-8(e) (1970), prohibited disclosure under the FOIA, but the court declined to discuss the merits. It chose instead to base its decision on the commercial
or financial information exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970). 34 A. L.2D at
1077. See note 141 infra. The Federal Power Commission dismissed an asserted FOIA
claim based on section 1905 in conjunction with the statutory exemption on the rationale
of California v. Richardson: section 1905 applies only to disclosure not authorized by
law. Reliability of Elec. & Gas. Serv., 4 P.U.R.4th 163, 164 (FPC), denying petition
for rehearing of 4 P.U.R. 4th 141 (F.P.C. 1974). And finally the District of
Columbia Circuit followed its decision in Grumman by holding that section 1905
fails to qualify under the statutory exemption "because it does not itself define
what information is exempt from disclosure." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Servs.
Administration, No. 74-1946, at 5 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 9, 1974), aff'g in part and rev'g in
part 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974); see Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031, 1033
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Statutes that protect specifically identified records are rarely litigated, but examples
do show up in the reports when they are used to protect information outside the specified class. See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
where it was held that private letter rulings were not protected from disclosure by section 6103(a)(1) of Title twenty-eight, United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(1)
(1970), since section 6103 applied only to "[tax] returns." 505 F.2d at 353-54 & n.1.
On the other hand, technical advice memoranda were protected from disclosure since
the memoranda are prepared from the specific set of facts contained in a taxpayer's return. Id. at 355.
77. Compare Evans v. Department of Transp. 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972) (alternate holding that section 1504 of title forty-nine,
United States Code, 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970), permitting the FAA to withhold information "when, in their judgment, a disclosure .. .is not required in the interest of the
public. ...." satisfies the statutory exemption), with Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d
1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that section 1504 does not satisfy the statutory exemption).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970).
79. Id. § 1306(a). Prior to 1974, three of the five district courts that considered
section 1306 held that it does not prevent mandatory disclosure under the FOIA, while
the remaining two district courts held that it may prevent disclosure under the statutory
exemption. Ordering disclosure of information sought to be withheld under section 1306
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Circuit in Stretch v. Weinberger ° held that HEW extended-care facility survey reports"' were not protected from compelled disclosure by
section 1306.82

Judge Hastie agreed with the district court that where

a statute does not identify some specific class or category of information Congress considers appropriate for exemption, but instead grants
discretion to an administrator to withhold information, it must also prescribe some guidelines for the exercise of that discretion before it satisfies the specificity requirement of the statutory exemption.

3

"Other-

were Stretch v. Weinberger, 359 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1973), afrd, 495 F.2d 639 (3d
Cir. 1974); Serchuk v. Richardson, Civ. No. 72-1212 (S.D. Fla., Nov. 28, 1972), affd
sub nom. Serchuk v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1974), and Schecter v. Richardson, Civ. No. 710-72 (D.D.C., July 17, 1972). Allowing nondisclosure were Schecter
v. Weinberger, Civ. No. 2319-72 (D.D.C., June 7, 1973), ordered held in abeyance, 498
F.2d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd, 506 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and California v.
Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd sub nom. California v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1974). In 1974, several of these cases were decided at
the circuit court level without reconciling the divergent views of the lower courts. See
notes 80-97 infra and accompanying text.
80. 495 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1974).
81. Extended care facility survey reports are compiled by HEW to determine
whether health care facilities in the states qualify for medicare reimbursements. Id. at
640.
82. Id.
83. Id., Judge Hastie stated the rule to be that information is "specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute"
only if a statute either identifies some class or category of items that Congress
considers appropriate for exemption or, at least, sets out legislatively prescribed
standards or guidelines that the Secretary must follow in determining what
matter shall be exempted from disclosure. Id. (emphasis added).
He was of the opinion that section 1306 did not satisfy the first condition of specifically
identifying a class of information. Id. But see California v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 767
(9th Cir. 1974). For a view contrary to Judge Hastie's, see discussion at notes 89-96
infra and accompanying text.
The government argued that if a nondisclosure statute provided for "unrestricted
discretion to exempt an undefined range of social security information from disclosure,
then [the statutory exemption] preserve[d] that unfettered and unguided power."
495 F.2d at 640. In effect, its argument was that, as used in the statutory exemption,
the word "'specifically' does not mean 'with some degree of particularity.'" Id. This
argument is based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the national security exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a) (Nov. 21,
1974), in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), and the similarity in language between
that exemption and the statutory exemption. See id. at 95 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring);
FOIA Comment 260-62. Judge Hastie distinguished Mink, saying that that opinion
dealt with a different exemption and that the executive order used to classify the documents in that case "had been specifically identified in the legislative history of the
[FOIA] as a valid exemption from disclosure that the Act would not alter." 495 F.2d
at 641.
Congress has effectively overruled the Supreme Court in the Mink case by amending the national security exemption. Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a) (Nov. 21, 1974),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
The fact that Congress overruled Mink as it interpreted the national security exemp-
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wise, there would be no escape from the unacceptable conclusion that
the word 'specifically,' as used in [the statutory exemption], is surplusage." 4 Judge Hastie's opinion was subsequently adopted by the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Serchuk v. Weinberger5 and by the

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Schecter v.
8 over a strong dissent by Judge MacKinnon,8 7 in opinions
Weinberger,"
ordering the disclosure of other HEW survey reports. Although Judge

MacKinnon could not sway his colleagues in the District of Columbia
Circuit, his reasoning8" was found more persuasive by Judge Smith of

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California v. Weinberger."°

Judge Smith was of the opinion that the word "specifically" as used in
the statutory exemption required no more than that the exemption "be
found in the words of the statute rather than the implication of it," 0
and that "all records" of a given agency, as used in section 1306, satisfied this requirement even though the records "were not described with
'some degree of particularity.' "91
The difference between the opposing interpretations of section
1306 represented by Stretch, Serchuk, and Shecter on the one hand,
and California and the dissent in Schecter on the other, is in the view
they took of the agency discretion permitted by section 1306. Stretch
and its progeny apparently interpreted the provision as permitting the
Secretary to disclose or withhold information with unfettered discretion so as to amount to an "authorization for administrative exemption 9 2 rather than a specific statutory exemption. Conversely, Judge
tion, however, should not affect the significance of that decision for interpreting the similarly phrased statutory exemption which was left unchanged by the amendments.
84. 495 F.2d at 640. But see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 95 n.* (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
85. 493 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1974) (decision without published opinion). A copy
of the action taken by the Fifth Circuit in Serchuk was provided the District of Columbia Circuit during its deliberations in Schecter v. Weinberger, 506 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir.
1974), and is set out in footnote four of that decision.
86. 506 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
87. Judge MacKinnon dissented in accordance with his view of the case as set forth
in the District of Columbia Circuit's previous order, Schechter v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d
1015 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), which held Schechter in abeyance
pending the Third Circuit's final disposition of Stretch. 506 F.2d at 1277 (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting).
88. Judge MacKinnon was of the opinion that since the reports were obtained by
the Secretary in the discharge of his duties under the Social Security Act, they fell within
the express ldnguage of section 1306 and therefore at least within the literal language
of the statutory exemption. 498 F.2d at 1015 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
89. 505 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1974).
90. Id. at 768.
91. Id.
92. See Schecter v. Weinberger, 506 F.2d 1275, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Stretch
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MacKinnon and the court in California construed the words of section

1306-"no disclosure... shall be made"-as a specific congressional
exemption which prohibits disclosure of all information received under
the Social Security Act, while the words "except as the Secretary...

may by regulation prescribe" merely allow the Secretary "to relax the
absolute prohibition established by Congress. ' 93 In other words, it is
the difference between a congressional authorization of an administrative exemption and a congressional exemption with power in an agency
to relax it.04
The distinction is a close one, but the result reached in California
appears to better fit the language used in the statutory exemption.

All

the information received under the Social Security Act is capable of
identification, and it is such information that Congress has "specifically" exempted from disclosure by section 1306. Moreover, nondisclosure statutes such as section 1306 which exempt all the information

received by a specific agency or under a specific program can be analogized to the "born classified" concept recently endorsed by Congress
in its consideration of the 1975 amendments9 5 to the FOIA. Under this
v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639, 640 (3rd Cir. 1974). The quoted language appears to
have been the argument put forward by the government in Stretch, and which Stretch
rejected. See id. at 640. Judge Smith, in his California decision, stated that if he
viewed section 1306 as an "authorization for administrative exemption" he would agree
with the conclusion reached in Stretch. 505 F.2d at 768.
93. 505 F.2d at 768; accord Schechter v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 1015-16 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
94. Id. "TMhere is a real difference between a statute in which the congressional
words themselves prohibit disclosure and a statute which authorizes an administrator to
exempt from disclosure." Id.
95. See H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6203, 6209 (1974). Congress indicates that this is one method to
protect sensitive material from in camera inspection even under the recently passed
amendments to the FOIA. Id. The amendments clarify the de novo review requirements by federal courts under section 552(a) (3) by providing that the court may make
an in camera examination of all records withheld by agencies under any. of the nine exempt categories of section 552(b). Pub. L. No. 93-502, § I(b)(2) (Nov. 21, 1974),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). This clarification, along with a change in the
language of the national security exemption, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a) (Nov. 21,
1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1970), would permit a district court to examine
in camera each requested document claimed by an agency to qualify under the national
security exemption. Before the amendments, in camera review under the national security exemption would ordinarily be precluded. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973);
FOIA Comment 252-59. Even after the amendments, however, in camera inspection
is not mandatory, and if an agency can establish through indexing, see Vaughn v. Rosen,
484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, on remand, 383 F. Supp.
1049 (D.D.C. 1974), that the requested material is in a class automatically classified
pursuant to a statute employing the "born classified" concept and thus eligible for the
statutory exemption, the agency's burden to justify its withholding should be met and
inspection by the court unnecessary.

Vol. 1975:416]

FOIA DEVELOPMENTS

concept, where a statute provides that a particular type of information
is classified, such information has classified status immediately upon its
coming into existence.96 "This means that there is no administrative
discretion to classify, . . . but only to declassify such data. ' 97 Although there is merit in the Stretch court's argument that it would be
consistent with the full disclosure policy of the FOIA to deny informa-

tion gathered under the Social Security Act protection from compelled
disclosure under section 1306, the construction of the California court
is itself consistent with the FOIA policy of restricting the discretion of

agency officials to withhold information. An official could not, at his
discretion, withhold information that would otherwise be available to
the public but only disclose information at his discretion that would otherwise not be available to the public. The result reached in California
also has the advantages of furthering -the congressional intent not to
have the FOIA repeal other statutes by implication and of suggesting an
analysis that was successfully used in other 1974 decisions.9"
96. For examples of such statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1970) (communication information); 42 U.S.C. § 2162 (1970) (restricted data); 50 U.S.C. §§ 403(d)(3), (g)
(1970) (intelligence sources and methods). See CONFERENCE REP. No. 93-1200, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) reprintedin U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6221, 6226 (1974).
97. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, supra note 95, at 6209.
98. The analysis of the statutory exemption in conjunction with section 1306 utilized in the Californiadecision is not inconsistent with the results reached by courts construing other nondisclosure statutes in 1974. Section 1504 of the Federal Aviation Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970), was found by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Robertson v. Butterfield, 498 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and by a district
court in the same circuit in Cutler v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 375 F. Supp. 722 (D.D.C.
1974), not to specifically exempt from compelled disclsoure under the FOJA information
held by the FAA. Section 1504 provides that upon objection by any person to disclosure
of information filed pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act the "Board or Administrator
shall order such information withheld . . .when, in their judgment, a disclosure...
would adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest
of the public ...... 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970). It is immediately obvious that this
is one of the nondisclosure statutes that California labeled a congressional authorization
of administrative exemption; as such it does not specifically exempt material from disclosure. Cutler recognized this distinction drawn by California between congressional
language restricting access to all information received by an agency and language giving
the agency unguided discretion to withhold information; Cutler makes the absence
of the former language a part of its holding. 375 F. Supp. at 724. The circuit court
in Robertson, on the other hand, bases its decision primarily upon the lack of specificity with which documents are identified in section 1504. 498 F.2d at 1032.
In light of the California opinion's demonstration that the narrowness of the class
of documents identified is not determinative where Congress exempts all documents received under a specific act, the approach adopted by Cutler is preferable to the focus
of Robertson. If the nondisclosure statute grants an agency unguided discretion to withhold information rather than to disclose it, the specificity with which the statute identifies the information should be a secondary consideration. The chief evil sought to be
remedied by the FOIA is discretionary withholding, whether that discretion is applied
to a narrow or a broad range of information.
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When construing nondisclosure statutes that identify a class of
documents with specificity but also provide a measure of agency discretion to withhold such information, the issue of congressional standards for the exercise of that discretion becomes important. In B & C
Tire Co. v. Internal Revenue Service,9 9 a district court found that handwritten notes compiled by a revenue agent in completing an audit were
not contemplated by section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
makes "[tax] returns" public records but "open to inspection only . . .
under rules and regulations prescribed by" the Secretary of the Treasury. 0 0 The government was attempting to include the agent's notes
within the protection of the statutory provision under the authority of
a Treasury Regulation defining tax returns to include items relating to
tax returns. 01' Although recognizing that certain regulations were contemplated by the nondisclosure statute, the court ruled that a regulation
which expanded the scope of the statute was invalid. Thus, material
within the purview of the regulation but not of the statute itself was
not exempted by the statute.10 2 However, the implication of B & C
99. 376 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
100. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(1) (1970). Section 6103(a)(1) provides in pertinent
part:
Returns made with respect to taxes . . . upon which the tax has been determined by the Secretary or his delegate shall constitute public records; but, except as hereinafter provided . . . they shall be open to inspection only upon
order of the President and under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate and approved by the President. Id.
See also 26 U.S.C. § 7213 (a) (1) (1970), which makes it unlawful to divulge any information contained in an income return.
Properly interpreted, the nondisclosure statute construed in B & C Tire Co. is of
the same type as section 1306 of the Social Security Act construed in California. Both
statutes exempt an entire class of documents from disclosure and then permit a measure
of agency discretion to relax the prohibition through valid regulations. The government
in B & C Tire Co., however, was attempting to use its authority to promulgate regulations to withhold documents not otherwise within the statute rather than to permit the
disclosure of documents otherwise protected by the statute.
Section 6103(a) (1) was an issue in several other 1974 cases construing the statutory exemption. Private letter rulings were held not to qualify as "tax returns" within
section 6103 (a) (1) and thus were not exempt from compelled disclosure under the statutory exemption in Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(holding that technical advice memoranda did qualify as information contained in a tax
return); accord, Fruehauf Corp. v. IRS, 369 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Queen'sWay to Fashion, Inc. v. United States, 34 An. L.2D 376 (Ct. Cl., Jan. 10, 1974) (discovery case). Sections 6103(a)(1) and 7213(a)(1) were held to be "a strong statutory bar
to the disclosure of income tax information" in Association of Am. R.R.s v. United
States, 371 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1974), thus preventing the ICC from publishing as
part of a public document certain information contained in the returns of railroads. See
notes 55-72 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the compulsory nature of
the exemptions.
101. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(a)-1(3) (1974).
102. 376 F. Supp. at 711-12.
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Tire Co. is that regulations restricting agency discretion within boundaries consistent with and authorized by the terms of a specific nondis-

closure statute would satisfy the requirement for congressionally imposed guidelines on agency discretion for the purposes of the statutory
exemption. The question of whether guidelines contained in administrative regulations are imposed by statute rather than by the agency
was made easier in this case since the nondisclosure statute expressly
provided for such regulations and the class of documents exempted
from disclosure by statute was sufficiently narrow to provide the court

a standard of comparison.
Incorporating external guidelines for the exercise of agency discretion to withhold information is less defensible, however, where the

source of the guidelines is not mentioned in the nondisclosure statute
itself. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Sears v. Gottschalk,10 3 although recognizing that specificity in the class of documents exempted alone was sufficient to prevent mandatory disclosure
under the FOIA, 0 4 also professed to find guidelines for the exercise

of agency discretion under section 122 of the Patent Act, which exempts "[a]pplications for patents" except, inter alia, "in such special

circumstances as may be determined by the Commissioner."'1 °

The

103. 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974).
104. "[Aipplications for patents" sufficiently identifies the class of items Congress deems appropriate for the exemption so that the absence of guidelines
.. .for the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion would not be determinative. Id. at 127.
105. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970). Ms. Sears requested the right to examine and copy
patent applications in the abandoned application category; she conceded the confidentiality of pending applications under section 122, and she also recognized that granted applications are already open to public inspection and copying. See id.99 112, 154
(1970). Abandoned patent applications were found by the court to be included under
"patent applications" for the purpose of section 122. 502 F.2d at 128.
The government's preliminary argument, accepted by the district court, that a request for "all existing abandoned U.S. patent applications" was not a request for "identifiable records" within the meaning of section 552(a) (3) was rejected by the circuit
court. Id. at 127. The purpose of the "identifiable records" requirement, according to
the circuit court, was to generate a "reasonable description enabling the Government employee to locate the requested records." Id. at 125; see Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424
F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1497, at
9; S.REP. No. 813, at 8. The government had made no claim that it did not know
what documents the plaintiff wanted nor where to locate them. Sears announced the
rule of the Fourth Circuit to be that "if otherwise locatable,. . . equitable considerations
of the costs, in time and money, of making records available for examination do not
supply an excuse for non-production." 502 F.2d at 126.
The recent amendments to the FOIA change the requirement that a request be for
"identifiable records" in section 552(a) (3) to a request that "reasonably describes such
records." Pub. L. No. 93-502 § 1(b) (1) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552
(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972). The purpose of the change in language is to insure that
a requirement for a specific title or file number cannot be the only requirement
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court found this phrase to incorporate the then existing administrative
standards for disclosure of patent applications embodied in the Patent
Since the standards found in that rule sufOffice rule of secrecy. 1°0

ficiently restricted the scope of the Commissioner's discretion to qualify
under the "specifically exempted" language of the statutory exemption
and since the legislative history of section 122 clearly showed that the
secrecy rule was intended to be codified by section 122,107 the court
found "no insuperable barrier to reading the guidelines for the exer-

cise of the Commissioner's discretion to disclose back into [section
122]."108
The attempt in Sears to qualify section 122 for the statutory exemption by going outside the statute to discover standards restricting
agency discretion is unsatisfactory.

The Patent Office rule of secrecy

is not mentioned in section 122, nor does the statute make clear what
are the "special circumstances" that would permit discsoure. Moreover, such groping is unnecessary. The discretion permitted the Commissioner under section 122 of the Patent Act is the same as that permitted under section 1306 of the Social Security Act--discretion to

disclose information otherwise statutorily exempt, rather than discretion to withhold it. The distinction drawn by the California decision,

and apparently missed by Sears, would have been sufficient to qualify
section 122 as a statute contemplated by the statutory exemption without resorting to an artificial discovery of standards restricting the ex-

ercise of agency discretion.
A proper interpretation of the 1974 litigation under the statutory
exemption, then, would suggest the existence of at least two methods
by which a nondisclosure statute may satisfy the "specifically exempted"
language of the exemption. The first is where the statute exempts all
the information received by a given agency pursuant to a specific statute or program, or identifies some class or category of exempt material
of an agency for the identification of documents. A "description" of a requested document would be sufficient if it enabled a profesional employee of
the agency who was familiar with the subject area of the request to locate the
record with a reasonable amount of effort. H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6203 (1974).
The emphasis on the ability to locate the requested records supports Sears' construction
of the original language of section 552(a) (3). The qualification -that requested records
must be locatable "with a reasonable amount of effort," however, should not be allowed
to shield records difficult to locate solely due to an agency's disorganization or lack of
adequate indexing. See FOIA Comment 290 & n.226.
106. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.14(a), (b) (1974). Subsection (a) establishes the secrecy
of pending patent applications, while subsection (b) extends that secrecy to abandoned
patent applications.
107. See H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952); S. REP. No. 1979, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
108. 502 F.2d at 127.
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when there is no difficulty identifying the information. 10 9 The other

category consists of nondisclosure statutes that permit an agency discretion either to disclose information that would otherwise be exempt by
statute, or, if statutory guidelines are provided, to withhold otherwise
non-exempt material. Only where it is not clear from the statutory

language whether a particular item of information is contemplated by
the statute or where the statute permits an agency unbridled discretion

to withhold information from disclosure should inclusion under the statutory exemption be denied.
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION EXEMPTION

Also exempted from the FOIA's mandate of compelled disclosure
are "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential." 1 10 Currently, the most
troublesome problem for the courts is to determine when concededly
commercial or financial information obtained from a person is "confi-

dential" within the meaning of the exemption."'

The legislative his-

109. But see 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) (prohibiting disclosure of any "trade secrets
or commercial or financial information"). Section 1905 has been uniformly held not
to satisfy the statutory exemption. See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text. A
possible distinguishing feature of section 1905 is that it prohibits the disclosure of several
general types of information without identifying any specific statute or program under
which the information is received.
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970). Previous courts have relied heavily on a literal
interpretation of the exemption to determine whether it applies to information withheld
under its authority. Thus, to qualify for protection the material must be (1) a trade
secret, or (2) information which is (a) commercial or financial, and (b) obtained from
a person, and (c)privileged or confidential. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673
(D.C. Cir. 1971), quoting Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d
Cir. 1971). See also Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d
578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970); K. DAvis § 3A.19 (Supp. 1970). But see Barceloneta Shoe
Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). However, matter within the exemption is generally released if it can "be rendered sufficiently anonymous by deletion
of the filing party's name and other identifying information." National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Fisher v. Renegotiation
Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Grummond Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation
Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580-88 (1970) (where the practice originated); Bristol-Myers Co.
v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); M.A.
Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
111. See FOIA Comment 264-66.
The 1974 case of Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'g 364 F.
Supp. 680 (D.D.C. 1973), settled a dispute among the district courts within the District
of Columbia Circuit, compare Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S.Ct. 238 (1974), and Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1292
(D.D.C. 1973) (Robinson, J.) modified in part and remanded, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir.
1974), with Petkas v. Staats, 364 F. Supp. 680 (D.D.C. 1973) (Parker, J.), rev'd, 501
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tory has been criticized for being unresponsive to the version of the
exemption enacted into law" 2 and hence has provided little guidance
113
for courts construing the breadth of the exemption.

In 1974, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton"14 defined the
phrase "confidential" for purposes of the exemption and provided specific guidelines for its application. In National Parks, a nonprofit edu-

cational and scientific organization sought disclosure of audits and annual financial statements filed in accordance with a statutory mandate

by companies operating concessions in the nation's parks."15 The district court had granted summary judgment to the government on -the
basis of the confidential information exemption, having found that the

information was of the kind "that would not generally be made availble for public perusal." 11

The circuit court discerned no error in the

district court's finding, but thought that, without more, such a finding
was insufficient to support application of the exemption." 7

The circuit

court declared that nondisclosure of financial information based on the

"confidential" criterion of the exemption also should be justified by the
legislative purpose underlying the exemption."" An exhaustive re-

view of that provision's legislative history" 9 convinced the court that
it was intended to serve a dual purpose. Phrasing the protected inter-

ests in terms of guidelines to be utilized by courts in applying the confidential information exemption, the court concluded that for information to be "confidential," its disclosure must be likely to have "either
of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government's ability to obF.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974), by holding that an administrative promise to maintain the
confidentiality of information made to a private party submitting information to the government is not, in and of itself, sufficient to qualify that material for protection under
the confidential information exemption. 501 F.2d at 889.
112. See K. DAvis § 3A.19, at 148-51 (Supp. 1970); Katz, supra note 7, at 126567.
113. The language of the exemption itself is thought by some to be capable of several constructions. See ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM 32-34; K. DAVIS § 3A.19,
at 147 (Supp. 1970).
114. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
115. Id. at 766. These statements are required to be filed with the Park Service. 16
U.S.C. § 20g (1970). Disclosure of the material to the Park Service is a mandatory
condition of the concessioners' right to operate in national parks. 498 F.2d at 770.
116. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404, 407 (D.D.C.
1972), rev'd, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d
698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425
F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467
(D.D.C. 1972); S. REP. No. 813, at 9.
117. 498 F.2d at 770.
118. Id. at 767.
119. See id. at 767-70,
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tain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the informa120
tion was obtained."'
Although these guidelines were successfully applied in several
other 1974 decisions,'1 21 the first guideline arguably was misapplied
120. Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
121. The guidelines set forth in the National Parks case have subsequently been applied approvingly by 1974 courts considering the confidentiality issue. See, e.g., Petkas
v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rural Housing Alliance v. United States
Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Saxbe, 34 An>. L.2D 992, 997 (D.D.C. May 9, 1974). Pacific Architects
& Eng'rs, Inc. v. Renegotiation Bd., 505 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1974), also indicated approval of the National Parks guidelines. Additionally, the Pacific Architects court outlined the "detailed justification" required by Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974), and Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1973), to accompany the index of documents submitted to the court to aid
it in resolving the conflicting claims as to the exempt status of the documents. 505 F.2d
at 385. The index supporting the confidential status should include
(a) the extent to which data of the sort in dispute is customarily disclosed to
the public, with specific factual or evidentiary material to support the conclusion reached; (b) the extent to which disclosure of the information will impair
the government's ability to obtain necessary information of this type in the future, with specific factual or evidentiary material to support the conclusion
reached; (c) the extent to which disclosure of the information will cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information is obtained, with specific factual or evidentiary material to support the
conclusion reached; and (d) the extent to which any harms of the type mentioned in (b) and (c) could be reduced or eliminated by nondisclosure of the
identity of the person submitting the information in dispute. Id.
Two 1974 cases decided before National Parks reached conclusions consistent with
its guidelines under the confidential information exemption. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Schlesinger, 34 AD. L.2o 1074 (E.D. Va., Apr. 4, 1974) (release of Employer Information Report and Affirmative Action Program required to be filed by all government
contractors would harm individual's competitive position); Levine v. United States, 34
AD. L.2D 633 (S.D. Fla., Mar. 2, 1974) (information on custom declaration forms not
confidential or privileged and therefore not protected by the confidential information exemption).
Application of the National Parks guidelines has not been uniform, however. The
district court in Ditlow v. Schultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974), purported to follow
National Parks in stating by way of dictum that much of the information contained on
United States customs declaration forms was "confidential" and therefore protected from
disclosure by the confidential information exemption. Id. at 329. But the court made
no finding that the information on the customs declaration forms was commercial or financial, and there was no finding that the "legitimate private interests" likely to be
harmed included the individual's competitive position in a business context. Absent such
findings, the confidential information exemption could not properly be invoked to protect the custom declaration forms.
Another district court case, decided before National Parks, may have reached the
proper decision by finding a report by a private defense contractor relating to possible
causes of the crash of an Air Force aircraft protected under the confidential information
exemption, but the court's emphasis on the government's pledge of confidentiality is
clearly inconsistent with the objective determination required after National Parks.
Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Iowa 1974). See
note 111 supra.
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Since most, if not all, of the informa-

tion in National Parks was supplied pursuant to statute and was a man-

datory condition of the concessioners' right to operate in the parks, 2 '
the court concluded there was "presumably no danger that public disclosure [would] impair the ability of the Government to obtain this

information in the future."'1 2 4 However, the government's ability to acquire information in the future could be impaired. A person who
knows that business information he provides to the government will be

protected from disclosure is more likely to comply more freely and fully
with statutory directives, thus easing the task of the government in collecting such information. If the information cannot be protected, however, a person is more likely to resist solicitation efforts by the government and to supply information reluctantly even when compelled to do
so by statute.' 25
The "trade secret" part of the exemption received judicial attention by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals when it was decided that a noncommercial scientist's research design was "not literally" a trade secret or item of commercial information and
therefore not eligible for protection. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504
F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
122. The court did not have sufficient evidence to apply the second guideline. On
the record before it the court could not accept the Association's argument that there existed no threat of substantial harm to the competitive position of the concessioners, and
thus remanded to the district court for additional evidence. 498 F.2d at 770.
Plaintiff Association argued that since section 20d of Title sixteen, United States
Code, 16 U.S.C. § 20d (1970), established a preference in favor of the renewal of contracts of concessioners satisfactorily performing under existing contracts, the concessioners were in effect monopolists and therefore had no competitive position to be impaired.
498 F.2d at 770. The court recognized this as a compelling argument but hypothesized
that disclosure of information about concession activities may result in injury to its competitive position in a non-concession enterprise and thought the government should be
permitted to introduce any evidence to that effect. Id. at 770-71. If only part of the
information was found to be confidential under the guidelines, the district court was instructed to delete such portions and disclose the rest. Id.
123. See note 115 supra.
124. 498 F.2d at 770.
125. It is not clear whether the National Parks court overlooked this argument or
purposefully omitted it to indicate concern with the government's complete inability to
obtain such information, rather than the degree of difficulty encountered in the process
of collecting the information. Assuming the court was concerned only with the complete inability of the government to obtain information, application of the first part of
the National Parks test may initially appear to have a peculiar effect by protecting information voluntarily submitted to the government while denying protection to information
required to be submitted to the government by statute-presumably that which is most
vital to governmental operation. This situation may not be siguificant, however, since
most of the information required by statute to be submitted may find protection under
the "competitive position" part of the confidentiality test or under other exemptions to
the FOIA. Although it is also likely that much of the information found to be confidential under one or both parts of the test may also properly be brought under the "trade
secrets" or "privileged" language of the exemption, the National Parks approach provides
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PERSONNEL AND MIDICAL FILES EXEMPTION

The FOIA also exempts from mandatory disclosure "personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 26 Prior to

1974, two circuit courts of appeal endorsed conflicting approaches to
the proper application of the "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy" criterion.

In Getman v. NLRB 27 the District of Columbia

Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that "a court reviewing the matter
de novo [should] balance the right of privacy of affected individuals
against the right of the public to be informed," with the balance tilted
in favor of disclosure. 28 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly rejected the balance of interest test in Robles v. EPA 29 by stating
that the interests of the person requesting the information and the need

of the public to be informed had nothing to do with personal privacy
and that to consider these interests would misconceive the plain intent
of the Act. 130 Thus, under the latter approach, only the degree of in-

vasion of personal privacy need be measured.' 3 '
a standard applicable where such a treatment of requested information would not be appropriate.
126. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970).
127. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Getman was the first federal appellate court
decision to reach the merits of an FOIA claim under the personnel and medical files
exemption. In Getman, law professors engaged in a study of NLRB voting practices
successfully sought to compel the Board to disclose the names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in certain elections.
128. 450 F.2d at 674. In applying this balancing of interests test, the Getman court's
initial inquiry was whether and to what extent disclosure of the information sought
would constitute an invasion of privacy of any person. Id. If an invasion of privacy
is found, the court "must also weigh the public interest purpose of [those seeking disclosure]". Id. at 675. Only when the public interest purpose of those seeking disclosure
outweighs the invasion of personal privacy will the court order the information disclosed.
Notice the subtle shift in emphasis between the phrases "right of the public in being
informed," id. at 674, and "public interest purpose of those seeking disclosure," id. at
675. In the former, the focus is on the right of the general public to the information
versus the right to privacy of an individual, while in the latter the focus is on the worthiness of purpose of those seeking disclosure. As is explained more fully in the text accompanying notes 142-44 infra, a court's emphasis upon the former is not necessarily
incompatible with an inquiry into the invasion of personal privacy. Considering the
worthiness of a request for disclosure as the balancing factor leads to additional problems. Cf. id. at 677 n.24. See notes 145-48 infra and accompanying text.
129. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973). In Robles, the plaintiffs successfully sought disclosure from the EPA of the results of a survey of homes and public buildings tested
for radioactive emissions, including the names and addresses of the occupants.
130. Id. at 846-47; see K. DAvis § 3A.4, at 120-21 (Supp. 1970).
131. 484 F.2d at 848. Robles also construed the term "similar files" for purposes
of the personnel and medical files exemption. Focusing on the words "personnel and
medical," the court stated that such files must have the
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Three 1974 decisions indicate that the Getman balance of interests approach is gaining support. Citing Getman, the court in Rural
Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture1 2 re-

manded the case to the district court to balance the invasion of personal
privacy which might be caused by the disclosure of a report, with the
names deleted, of case studies produced in an investigation into alleged racial discrimination in a government loan program, against the
public-interest purpose of the one seeking the information. 133

Simi-

larly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Wine Hobby USA, Inc.
v. Internal Revenue Service 3 4 weighed the commercial interest of a

seller-distributor of home winemaking equipment in obtaining a list of
same characteristics of confidentiality that ordinarily attach to information in
medical or personnel files; that is, to such extent as they contain "intimate details" of a "highly personal" nature, they are within the umbrella of the exemption. Id. at 845, citing Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The court further stated that the information must relate to a specific person or individual in records similar to a health history or employment record; the exemption would
have "no relevancy to information that deals with physical things." Id.; cf. K. DAvis
§ 3A.22, at 164 (Supp. 1970). Thus, Robles ordered the disclosure of an EPA survey
of homes and public buildings tested for radioactive emissions.
The confusion generated by requiring records to contain "intimate details" of a
"highly personal" nature in order to qualify as "similar files" is illustrated by two 1974
cases that purport to follow Robles and apply its standard to the same type of records
with conflicting results. The court in Ditlow v. Shultz, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974),
found United States customs declaration forms to be a "similar file," while another in
Levine v. United States, 34 AD. L.2D 633 (S.D. Fla., Mar. 2, 1974), rejected this contention without discussion. The Ditlow court seemed to have focused on the class of information generally found in personnel or medical files in holding that information concerning names, ages, citizenship, residency, relationship of family members, and acquisitions while abroad contained in the customs declaration forms satisfied the Robles criteria.
In Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, in finding a list of names of home winemakers to be within the phrase
"similar files," appears to have taken a sounder approach by interpreting that term
broadly in order to prevent the release of requested information that would result in a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. A narrow interpretation which focuses on the similarity that the requested files have to personnel and medical files might
preclude inquiry into the more crucial question of whether there will be an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy. id. at 135. The court in Wine Hobby found the common
denominator to be the "personal quality of information in the file" and did not "believe
that the use of the term 'similar' was intended to narrow the exemption from disclosure
and permit the release of files which would otherwise be exempt because of the resultant
invasion of privacy." Id.; accord, Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the exemption was designed to protect
individuals from public disclosure of intimate details of their lives).
132. 498 F.2d 73, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
133. Id. at 77-78. The district court was also instructed to consider whether the information sought was available from other sources, such as asking the individuals independently for similar information. Id.
134. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
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names and addresses of persons who had applied for a federal home
winemaking permit against the invasion of privacy which would result
from such a disclosure. 135 Additionally, the Second Circuit in Rose
v. Department of the Air Force3 6 acknowledged that the interest of
cadets in preserving the secrecy of case summaries of adjudications of

the Honor and Ethics Code Committee of the Air Force Academy was
not the only interest to be considered in determining whether diselo-

sure was mandated by the FOIA.137 While recognizing that judicial
balancing of competing interests does not promote the promulgation
of definitive disclosure guidelines13 8 and that it is rejected as prohibited
by the FOIA by courts considering the other exemptions,""9 both Wine
Hobby and Rural Housing interpret the "unless clearly unwarranted"

language of the exemption as mandating an exception to this prohibition. 1 40 Further support for this reading is found in the legislative history of the personnel and medical files exemption. 1
135. Wine Hobby wanted the names and addresses of the registrants in order to forward catalogues and sales announcements regarding its products. Id. at 134. The court
found this attempt to exploit a private commercial interest to have no direct or indirect
public interest purpose and could not outweigh the relatively minor invasion of personal
privacy which would occur from the receipt of "unsolicited and possibly unwanted mail
from Wine Hobby. . . ." Id. at 137. Disclosure was thus denied. Id.
136. 495 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 268. The court stated that the goal of the personnel and medical files
exemption was "a workable compromise between individual rights 'and the preservation
of public rights to Government information.'" Id. at 269, citing H.R. REP. No. 1497,
at 11. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to view the case
summaries in camera to determine whether, after suitable deletions, any invasion of privacy would be "clearly unwarranted." Id. at 268.
The case summaries were sought by a graduate of the United States Air Force
Academy to document a law review article concerning the disciplinary systems at the
service academies. Id. at 262.
138. Definitive guidelines are a goal of the FOIA. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 2,
S. REP. No. 813, at 3.
139. See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
140. 502 F.2d at 136; 498 F.2d at 77. See also Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
674 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
141. The Senate Report states:
The phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" enunciates a
policy that will involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an
individual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the public's right to governmental information. S. R P. No. 813, at
9 (emphasis added).
It would be consistent with the overall policy of the FOIA, however, and more in line
with Robles to interpret the Senate Report's remarks about a balancing of competing interests to mean that Congress itself struck the balance with the phrase "clearly unwarranted," in which case the courts have merely to apply that standard without further
balancing in particular cases. The House Report appears stronger on this point:
The limitation of a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" provides a proper balance between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the preservation of the public's right to Government information
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Although some balancing is probably required in the application
of this provision, there is a danger that courts will weigh the wrong
interests. For instance, the Getman, Wine Hobby, and Rural Housing
courts looked to the particular purpose of the person requesting the

information to determine the interest in favor of disclosure. 4 ' In contrast, Rose measured the interest of the public in obtaining the infor-

mation.143 The latter approach seems preferable, since weighing the
interest of the person seeking disclosure raises the undesirable possibility that the same information would be available to one party while simultaneously refused to another.1 44 An approach more consistent with
the overall purpose of the Act-to insure disclosure of agency-held information to "any person"--would be to consider the interest of the
public in having access to the information, rather than the particular
individual's purpose. Moreover, balancing of the public's interest in

disclosure would avoid the difficulties encountered in yet another 1974
opinion, Ditlow v. Shultz. 45 In balancing the possible invasion of privacy resulting from disclosure of the names on United States customs
declaration forms' 46 against the need of the plaintiff to acquire the information, the court noted that a corollary of releasing information only

to persons having a worthy motive is that the information must be used
only by that person and only for the purpose which the court found
to justify its disclosure. 1 47 Such a release to selected individuals would

cause an intractable enforcement problem, 14 and the FOIA has no
provision anticipating a solution. It would seem that any after-the-fact
penalty imposed by a court-for contempt, perhaps-for any violation
of the terms of release would be inadequate since the privacy interest
* * * ,H.R. RP. No. 1497, at 11 (emphasis added).
See also Davis, supra note 7, at 766, 806.
142. 450 F.2d at 75; 502 F.2d at 137; 498 F.2d at 78.
143. 495 F.2d at 269.
144. This was a criticism of the earlier version of section three of the APA that the
FOIA was intended to correct. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1666, supra note 69, at 7, 16,
27, 35, 60, 82, 95, 109, 140, 237; H.1L REP. No. 1497, at 4-6; S. REP. No. 813, at 5.
145. 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974).
146. The plaintiff in Ditlow sought disclosure of the names and addresses from customs declaration form 6059-B completed by all persons who entered the country by air
during a certain period from points in Asia and Australia in order to fulfill their obligations as representatives of that class of all passengers who were charged unlawful fares
in violation of law as alleged in a related class action. Id. at 327.
147. Id. at 330, quoting Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 677 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The necessity of discussing the enforcement of such restricted disclosure was sidestepped in Ditlow, however, when the court ruled that the availability of the names to
the plaintiff through discovery in a related class action tipped the balance in favor of
personal privacy in the FOIA suit. Id. at 331.
148. See generally Note, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act:
Getman v. NLRB, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 539 (1972).
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sought to be protected would have already suffered. That problem
is avoided if the interest balanced against the invasion of personal privacy is the interest of the general public in having access to the information. Then, disclosure of the information to any member of the
public would be in accord with the terms of release.
INVESTIGATORY FILES EXEMPTION

The investigatory files exemption to the FOIA has been extensively modified and its protection restricted by recent amendments.14 9
149. Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(1970). As amended, the exemption protects matters that are
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
(D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record
compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence
investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential
source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger
the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel. . . . Id.
No longer is an entire file exempt from compelled disclosure but only such records in
the file whose secrecy is justified by the specifically enumerated criteria. Prior to this
amendment, the exemption protected "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970), amended in Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974).
The pertinent legislative history of the latter clearly indicates that one purpose of the
exemption was to protect the government's "case in court" from premature discovery by
a party in litigation with the government. H.R. REP.No. 1497, at 11; S. REP.No. 813,
at 9; see Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 71112 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D.P.R.
1967); K. DAvIs § 3A.23, at 164-65 (Supp. 1970). Judicial recognition of this purpose
was reinforced in the pre-amendment 1974 cases. See, e.g., Wellman Indus., Inc. v.
NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 61 (1974) (employer not entitled
to disclosure of affadavits obtained by an NLRB investigator during his inquiry into
union objections to a representation election); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger,
34 AD. L.2) 1074, 1079 (E.D. Va., Apr. 4, 1974) (purpose of investigatory files exemption is only to prevent premature discovery by a defendant in an enforcement proceeding); cf. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 371 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1974) (discovery
case).
Under the original language of the exemption, the cases were in disagreement
whether, once the litigation was terminated or abandoned without prospect of future enforcement proceedings being brought, the exemption continued to apply even to those
files concededly "investigatory." Compare Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th
Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); and Cooney
v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (all requiring
enforcement proceedings to be "imminent" before the exemption was to apply), with
Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 238
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However, since the amendment carries over some of the language

of the original exemption -to the effect that before material
is found to be within its purview the material must be shown to
be in an "investigatory" file that is "compiled for law enforcement purposes," 110 the pre-amendment cases interpreting this language will presumably retain precedential value. Those cases 5'- generally focused
'52
on "how and under what circumstances the files were compiled,"'
that [could]
exempting the information if it "relate[d] to anything
53
proceeding."'
fairly be characterized as an enforcement
In 1974, courts experienced great difficulty in applying these
standards to determine whether an agency's internal monitoring of its

own employees to insure that they were acting in accordance with its
statutory mandate and regulations was an investigationfor law enforcement purposes. The distinction between an investigation for purposes
of prosecution and routine monitoring of day-to-day agency activities
is difficult to perceive. Most information gathered by the government
concerning its internal operations ultimately is used to determine the

legality of activities within an agency and is thus in one sense for "law
(1974); Aspin v. Laird, 491 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisberg v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974); Frankel
v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); and Evans v. Department of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972)
(all applying the exemption even beyond the conclusion of all relevant enforcement proceedings). The effect of the amended exemption would be to support the earlier line
of cases requiring the prospect of law enforcement proceedings for the exemption to be
available. See Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b)(7)(A), (B) (Nov. 21, 1974),'amending 5
U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970). The amended exemption also supports those cases denying
protection to information when disclosure would not injure the government in the particular case. Compare Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Saxbe, 34 AD. L.2D 992
(D.D.C. May 9, 1974) (investigatory files exemption improperly invoked where there
was no problem with premature disclosure or revealing of confidential sources), with
Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 238 (1974); and
Green v. Kleindienst, 379 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1974) (once documents are classified
as "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes" the exemption attaches
regardless of whether compelled disclosure would injure the government in the particular case).
150. Pub. L. No. 93-502 § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)
(1970).
151. See Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d
24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 238 (1974).
152. Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 2405 (1974); accord, Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073,
1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 238 (1974).
153. Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973), quoting
Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970).
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enforcement purposes." Further, this information could conceivably
support disciplinary or even criminal actions against individual employees, and the statutory language appears broad enough to encompass
all such internal agency audits. However, such a broad reading of the
exemption would defeat a primary purpose of the Act: "to provide
public access to information concerning the Government's own activities. 1 54
Recognizing these difficulties, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture5 5 distinguished two types of files relating to gov-

ernment employees-those containing reports gathered through surveillance or oversight of employees' job performance, and those containing "investigations which focus directly on specifically alleged illegal acts . . . of particular identified officials, acts which could, if

proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions."' 15 6 Protection from man154. Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 81
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
155. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Rural Housing sought a report of an investigation by the Department of Agriculture
into alleged discrimination in governmental housing projects in Florida. The investigation resulted from allegations that the staff of the Farmers Home Administration discriminated on the basis of race and national origin in arranging government loans. The
investigation culminated in a report concluding that there was no substantial evidence
of discrimination. Id. at 75.
156. Id. at 81 (emphasis added). See also Center for Nat'l Policy Review v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
As Rural Housing indicates, the investigatory files exemption has been recognized
as applying to civil as well as criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494
F.2d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 238 (1974); Evans v. Department
of Transp., 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970); B & C Tire Co. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708, 713 n.1l (N.D. Ala. 1974) (dictum).
Even though the Senate Report refers only to "law violators" in its discussion of the
exemption, S. REP. No. 813, at 9, adequate support for extending the exemption to civil
proceedings is found in the House Report where it says:
This exemption covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds
of laws, labor and securities laws as well as criminal laws. This would include
files prepared in connection with related government litigation and adjudicative
proceedings. H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 11.
Professor Davis suggests that the House interpretation may be broader than the language of the exemption warrants. K. DAvis § 3A.23, at 164 (Supp. 1970). But see
FOIA Comment 276 n.143.
The 1974 case of Center for Nat'l Policy Review v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cites the House Report as authority for extending the coverage of the
exemption to an administrative determination of continued eligibility for government financial assistance. Id. at 373. The Attorney General also takes the position that the
exemption can be invoked for materials gathered for an administrative proceeding. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM 37-38. There is no indication in the legislative history that information gathered for administrative proceedings should not qualify as in-
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datory disclosure would be available only to files of the latter type.
This analysis is consistent with earlier cases in that it determines

whether a file is both investigatory and compiled for law enforcement
purposes at the time the file is first established.157

It is also consistent

with the overall purpose of the FOTA-to ensure public access to government-held information-by narrowly restricting the types of files
that satisfy the exemption to those focusing on specific illegal activities of

particular officials. Otherwise, agencies could transform their monitoring activities into an overbroad category of material unavailable to the
public. Moreover, in requiring a focus on specific illegal activity, the
analysis suggested by Rural Housing provides the same treatment to law

violators who are government employees as to those who are private
citizens.' 58
Two weeks before its decision in Rural Housing, a different

panel 50 of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Center for National Policy Review v. Weinbergei' 0° approved what appears
to be a more permissive construction of the phrase "compiled for law
enforcement purposes," while separately applying the focus test to dis-

tinguish routine internal monitoring from agency investigations.' 6"

In

formation compiled for "law enforcement purposes," and its designation as such is in
harmony with the policy of protecting investigatory techniques and sources of information of investigatory bodies.
157. See, e.g., Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
158. 498 F.2d at 81. The legislative history of the investigatory files exemption
draws no distinction between governmental employees and private citizens. Id. at n.45;
see H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 11; S. REP. No. 813, at 9. As further guidance to the trial
judge on remand, the Rural Housing court observed:
In so determining [whether the file is compiled for law enforcement purposes], a court must of course be wary of self-serving declarations of any
agency; it must be clear to the court that more than ephemeral possibilities of
enforcement were anticipated by the agency in undertaking the investigation.
If an investigatory file is compiled for the purpose of determining whether a
law enforcement proceeding should be brought (in the same manner as against
a private citizen) and against whom, then, whether the agency concludes that
proceedings are necessary or not, the agency may utilize exemption 7 to protect
its investigatory process and sources. 498 F.2d at 82 n.48.
On the record before it, the Rural Housing court could not determine whether the
purpose of an investigation into alleged racial discrimination in arranging loans under
the Rural Housing Program "was to consider an action equivalent to those which the
Government brings against private parties," id. at 82, and thus exempt, or merely the
customary surveillance of government employee performance and not exempt. It thus
remanded the case to the trial court for additional evidence. Id.
159. The panel adjudicating the Center case consisted of Danaher, Senior Circuit
Judge, Leventhal, Circuit Judge, and Kaufman, United States Judge for the District of
Maryland. The panel deciding the Rural Housing case consisted of Bazelon, Chief
Judge, and Robb and Wilkey, Circuit Judges.
160. 502 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
161. In separately analyzing the investigatory element of the exemption, the Center
court stated that when an "inquiry departs from the routine and focuses with special in-
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Center, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court and found the undisclosed portions of twenty-two open
and active files involving an HEW review of suspected discrimination
or segregation practices in public school systems receiving federal aid

exempt from compelled disclosure under the investigatory files exemption."

2

To carry out its statutory mandate to prevent racial dis-

crimination in any activity or program that receives federal financial
assistance, 163 the Office for Civil Rights of HEW makes factual investigations of public school systems receiving such assistance whenever
there is reason to suspect a school system may be practicing racial seggregation or discrimination. 0 " After initial reliance on voluntary compliance with federal racial standards, the statute prescribes the ultimate
sanction of termination of financial assistance upon an administrative
determination that racial discrimination exists.'0 5 The court in Center
found that such an administrative determination had the "salient characteristics of 'law enforcement' contemplated by the wording of [the

investigatory files exemption]"' 66 so that when an agency having both
voluntary compliance and formal determination functions gathers information for either purpose, its files are "compiled for law enforcement
purposes.'

67

tensity upon a particular party, an investigation is underway." Id. at 373. The material
on racial discrimination in public schools that HEW sought to protect from compelled
disclosure was acquired from a detailed examination of every file in the subject school
systems, along with a visit to every school in these systems and interviews with teachers
and students. This type of activity, according to the court, was the kind of "special scrutiny" that went beyond general administrative oversight and thus qualified as "investigatory." Id. at 374.
162. Id. at 372.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
164. 502 F.2d at 372. The Center for National Policy Review sought disclosure of
a large number of files compiled during such factual investigations. HEW yielded such
parts of the files containing factual data submitted to the agency as a matter of routine,
id. at 374, but claimed the remaining material, consisting of pupil and teacher interviews
and records of detailed examinations of individual school files, was protected from compelled disclosure by the investigatory files exemption, id.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
166. 502 F.2d at 373. See note 156 supra. Even though an administrative proceeding to determine ineligibility for federal financial assistance "is not attended by the same
safeguards and procedures as a judicial determination in a criminal or civil proceeding,
it is a governmental action that must be accompanied by due procedure." Id., citing
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
167. Id. Even though initial reliance is placed on voluntary compliance, the effectiveness of the preliminary procedures depends largely upon the sanction held in reserve.'
See Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 61
(1974) (discussing the eventual adjudicatory power of the NLRB). The file compiled
for negotiation is also compiled for use, if necessary, in a formal action. 502 F.2d at
373. The court said it need not consider the case of an agency that has only consultative authority. Id. n.4.
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Judge Leventhal's opinion in Center is not helpful in supplying

guidelines for the proper application of the investigatory files exemption.

Its analysis of each element of the exemption leaves one with

the impression that if an element can conceivably be satisfied independently, then the exemption applies.1 6

The files of any govern-

ment agency with whatever type of sanctioning powers, however remote and rarely implemented, would seem to be "compiled for law enforcement purposes" under the construction of the phrase offered in

Center.1 0 If that is established, these agencies would only have to
further establish that any gathered material "focuses with special intensity upon a particular party" to resist disclosure-a burden not difficult to bear. Lacking is the recognition made in the Rural Housing

opinion that an overbroad construction of either element of the exemption ultimately makes the exception the rule and creates protection for

material that the FOIA intended to be available to the public.170 Rural
168. Judge Leventhal recognized that the separate elements of the exemption do
"fuse and interact," 502 F.2d at 374, but he failed to discuss them in that posture other
than to say: "Taking the provision as a whole, we conclude that these 22 files fall
within the literal meaning of the statute as 'investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes."' Id.
169. Cf. Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 95
S. Ct. 61 (1974).
170. See notes 155-58 supra and accompanying text. There are other weaknesses
in Judge Leventhal's opinion. HEW had disclosed material that came to it as a matter
of routine from schools receiving federal financial assistance and only resisted disclosure
of the material that was collected during its inquiries into alleged cases of racial discrimination or segregation. During the course of his opinion, Judge Leventhal stated
that the court thought the "plaintiffs were entitled to access to those parts of the 'open
and active' files . . . that contain the kind of factual data submitted . . . as a matter
of routine" but not "the balance of materials in these 22 files" since the balance was
"compiled through 'investigations' rather than routine monitoring." 502 F.2d at 37374 (emphasis added). No attempt was made to explain how the different information
was arranged; whether the investigatory information was in a separate file within the
general file for each school system; whether all the information, from both investigatory
and routine monitoring operations, for each school system was lumped together in a general file; or whether all the investigatory information was filed separately from the routine monitoring files. It is possible to read the Center opinion as authorizing a court
to go through an investigatory file and release some documents while suppressing others.
At the time of this opinion, however, once a file was deemed covered by the investigatory files exemption such selective disclosure was not permitted. See, e.g., Frankel v.
SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972); Evans v. Department
of Transp., 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
A final shortcoming is Judge Leventhal's confusion in certain respects of the policy
behind the investigatory files exemption with that behind the personal privacy exemption. He listed some of the policy reasons supporting his decision as "the protection
of persons who are being or have been investigated from unwarranted invasion of privacy and damage to reputation" and the fact that the agency's files "often contain privileged material as well as material that is potentially and needlessly damaging to the
careers and reputations of local teachers and school officials." 502 F.2d at 374. At
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Housing is more consistent with the Act because it focuses on the initial purpose of the file to determine whether a file is both investiga-

tory and compiled for law enforcement purposes. This is preferable
to constructing possible uses for such material compiled by an agency
with sanctioning powers and to determining separately whether an in71
vestigation took place.1
CONCLUSION

The volume of FOIA litigation shows no signs of lessening. Although the gradual process of judicial construction and interpretation
of the Act through 1974 has reduced the ambiguities and sharpened
the protective limits of the exemptions, the reluctance of agencies to
support the Act's mandate for disclosure and their ability to outlast the
timid or less financially able opponent in extended litigation has permitted them to blunt the effectiveness of the FOIA and to frustrate
the intentions of its drafters. This agency behavior is the direct cause
of perhaps the most significant development in 1974---enactment by
Congress of amendments to the FOIA 172 which become effective in
1975. These amendments generally streamline the procedure through
which requests for information are to be processed, and they impose
the time of this decision, these statements of policy properly belonged to the personal
privacy exemption, see notes 126-148 supra and accompanying text, not the investigatory
files exemption. However, Judge Leventhal may have only been guilty of applying the
standards of the proposed amendment prematurely. See Pub. L. No. 93-502 § 2(b)
(Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970), quoted in pertinent part in
note 149 supra.
171. See Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73,
82 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Judge Leventhal apparently recognized the confusion his opinion in Center could
create. In a supplemental opinion denying a rehearing, filed subsequent to the decision
in Rural Housing, he clarified his original statements in Center:
We rejected that contention [that the prospect of law enforcement action was
too remote for the exemption to apply] in this case, but we did not mean that
the exemption is established by the mere fact that one of the purposes of opening a file is investigative, or that sanctions hover as a possibility somewhere
down the road, or that some material in some file may at some point be used
for some law enforcement purpose. With that kind of extrapolation the exemption clause would reach so far as to swallow up the basic statutory presumption of disclosure. In considering whether a request for disclosure involves "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes," the court
will of course give consideration to the executive's submission, but it will be
governed, not by logic pushed to extremes, but by good sense and the essential
heft of the case. 502 F.2d at 375.
Judge Leventhal properly attempted to bring Center more into line with Rural
Housing, but his choice of language ("good sense and the essential heft of the case")
continues to provide no adequate guidelines for courts to follow in future cases and can
only lead to confusion.
172. Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), effective
February 19, 1975.
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maximum time limits within which an agency must respond to a request. 1 78 If an agency does not respond within such time, the requester of information is deemed to have exhausted his administrative
remedies and may then bring a suit against the agency to compel it
to disclose the requested material.' 74 Moreover, a court may assess
"reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred" if the requesting party "substantially prevail[s]" on his request. 175 When the agency's refusal to voluntarily disclose the information is of doubtful validity, the award of attorney's fees and litigation
expenses should encourage those with limited financial resources to
make the agency comply with the FOIA. The effect of these procedural provisions along with several substantive changes 176 should be to
reduce significantly the ability of government agencies to avoid their
duty to disclose non-exempt information and ultimately to permit realization of the congressional goal of full and prompt public disclosure
of government information.
173. Id. § 1(c), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). Subsection (c) adds the following paragraph to section 552(a):
(6) (A) Each agency, upon any request for records made under paragraph
(1), (2), or (3) of this subsection shall(i) determine within ten days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
public holidays) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply
with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of
such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination;
and
(ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty
days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of such appeal. If on appeal the denial of the request for records is
in whole or in part upheld, the agency shall notify the person making such
request of the provisions for judicial review of that determination under
paragraph (4) of this subsection.
Other requirements aimed at easing access to public information include the quarterly
publishing and distribution of an index providing identifying information for the public,
of agency materials, id. § 1(a), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970), the establishment of a uniform schedule of fees limited to the direct costs of search and duplication,
id. § I(b)(2), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970), and the filing by each agency of
a detailed annual report with Congress covering administration of the FOIA during the
year, id. § 3, amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
174. Id. § 1(c), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
175. Id. § l(b), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970).
176. The amendments significantly change the effect and scope of the investigatory
files exemption, id. § 2(b), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (1970), see note 149 supra,
and the national security exemption, id. § 2(a), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1) (1970).
The new language of the national security exemption requires not only that information
be classified according to executive order, but also that it actually meets the criteria established by the executive order. Id. See note 95 supra. Any "reasonably segregabl
portion of a record" not meeting the qualifications of the exemptions can be disclosed.
Id. § 2(c), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
The requirement that a request be for "identical records" has been changed to a
request that "reasonably describes such records." Id. § 1(b)(1), amending 5 U.S.C. §"
552(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1972). See note 105 supra.

